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 2 
Abstract 1 
Typically, multisensory illusion paradigms emphasise the importance of synchronous visuotactile 2 
integration to induce subjective embodiment towards another body. However, the extent to which 3 
embodiment is due to the ‘visual capture’ of congruent visuoproprioceptive information alone remains 4 
unclear. Thus, across two experiments (total N = 80), we investigated how mere visual observation of 5 
a mannequin body, viewed from a first-person perspective, influenced subjective embodiment 6 
independently from concomitant visuotactile integration. Moreover, we investigated whether slow, 7 
affective touch on participants’ own, unseen body (without concomitant touch on the seen mannequin) 8 
disrupted visual capture effects to a greater degree than fast, non-affective touch. In total, 40% of 9 
participants experienced subjective embodiment towards the mannequin body following mere visual 10 
observation, and this effect was significantly higher than conditions which included touch to 11 
participants own, unseen body. The velocity of the touch that participants received (affective/non-12 
affective) did not differ in modulating visual capture effects. Furthermore, the effects of visual capture 13 
and perceived pleasantness of touch was not modulated by subthreshold eating disorder 14 
psychopathology. Overall, this study suggests that congruent visuoproprioceptive cues can be sufficient 15 
to induce subjective embodiment of a whole body, in the absence of visuotactile integration and beyond 16 
mere confabulatory responses.  17 
 3 
1. Introduction  18 
 19 
Body ownership, the feeling that our body belongs to us and is distinct from other people’s bodies, 20 
is a fundamental component of our sense of self 1,2. Intuitively, this feeling appears stable and durable 21 
amongst humans, yet scientific studies have demonstrated that the sense of body ownership is a fragile 22 
outcome of integrating multiple sensory signals. Such signals originate via exteroceptive modalities 23 
(i.e. outside the body) such as vision and touch 3,4, specifically within the boundaries of peripersonal 24 
space surrounding the body 5,6. Additionally, incoming signals emerge via interoceptive modalities (i.e. 25 
within the body) such as proprioception and heart rate 7–9. Together, exteroceptive and interoceptive 26 
sensory signals are integrated to create a coherent sense of body ownership through which we interact 27 
with our environment 2. 28 
 29 
Experimental paradigms have been successfully used to investigate how body ownership is 30 
shaped by the integration of incoming multisensory information. For example, in the Rubber Hand 31 
Illusion (RHI)10, individuals experience ownership over a fake (rubber) hand when placed in a congruent 32 
anatomical position and stroked in temporal synchrony with their own hand, which is hidden from view. 33 
This has been recently extended to ownership over an entire body (Full Body Illusion), of which 34 
different variations exist. Participants can perceive a change in self-location which induces an illusory 35 
experience of being in a position outside of their physical body 11, or an illusory ownership towards 36 
another’s body from a third-person perspective 12 or first-person perspective 13,14.  In such illusions, the 37 
source of tactile stimulation on one’s own, unseen body (part) is attributed to the location of the visually 38 
perceived fake body (part) when the two are stroked synchronously, which is argued to give rise to 39 
subjective self-reports of illusory body ownership and a mislocation in one’s own sense of body position 40 
(i.e. proprioceptive drift) 4. Importantly, such effects typically occur within the constraints of top-down 41 
contextual factors, including the orientation 3,15, visual perspective 16–18, and appearance 13,19,20 of the 42 
embodied body (part). Indeed, research has shown that the strength of the illusion is modulated by the 43 
distance between the real and fake body (part), with greater spatial discrepancies decreasing the 44 
likelihood of integration between visuoproprioceptive signals 21–23. 45 
 46 
 4 
Importantly, it has long been argued that the synchrony of the perceived touch with vision is a 47 
necessary condition for illusory ownership to occur, rather than asynchrony which is typically used as 48 
a control condition within multisensory illusion paradigms15. However, the role of synchronous 49 
visuotactile integration as a necessary component to trigger illusory embodiment remains debated 24,25. 50 
Research has shown that illusory embodiment could still be induced based purely on visual information 51 
of a fake body (part) in the absence of visuotactile stimulation 25–27, or based on merely expected but 52 
not experienced synchronous tactile stimulation 28, and even following asynchronous visuo-tactile 53 
stimulation, provided that spatial congruence is adhered to between the real and fake body (part) 29 (see 54 
24 for review). Such evidence highlights that synchronous visuotactile input can strengthen illusory 55 
embodiment, by contributing to the downregulation in the weighting of proprioceptive signals regarding 56 
one’s own limb position in relation to vision 30. However, from a computational perspective, congruent 57 
visuoproprioceptive cues may be sufficient to induce such embodiment, suggesting that subsequent 58 
visuotactile input may not be a necessary component to trigger this process 25,26,31 (see 32 for review). 59 
  60 
Studies which have investigated illusory body ownership in the absence of tactile stimulation 61 
have predominantly investigated this effect during the RHI (e.g. 25,33,34), with little research conducted 62 
towards a whole body 16. Among the latter, some have argued that synchronous visuotactile integration 63 
is a necessary condition to elicit illusory ownership in the full body illusion 13, while studies using 64 
virtual reality have found evidence to the contrary, following illusory ownership towards a virtual body 65 
in the absence of visuotactile integration 14,16. Therefore, we wished to investigate whether subjective 66 
visual capture of embodiment could occur towards a real mannequin body with a static field of view, 67 
from a first-person visual perspective in the ‘physical world’.  In this context, ‘visual capture’ is defined 68 
as the degree of embodiment due solely to passive, visual perception of the fake body (part) viewed 69 
from a first-person perspective, independent from tactile stimulation (hereafter referred to as ‘visual 70 
capture of embodiment’) 35,36.  71 
 72 
 Interestingly, a tendency to weight visual information over other somatosensory signals has 73 
been recently observed in neuropsychological, right hemisphere patients with body representation 74 
deficits (e.g. 36–39). Moreover, alterations in the weighting and integration of sensory information has 75 
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been implicated within neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism 40,41, and psychiatric disorders 76 
such as schizophrenia 42–44, and eating disorders 45,46. Importantly, such alterations are argued to reflect 77 
an instability in the bodily self within these populations 47,48. However, whilst ‘pure’ visual capture 78 
conditions have been tested in right hemisphere patients, evidence for heightened visual dominance 79 
within eating disorder patients derives from multisensory illusion studies finding that both synchronous 80 
and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation led to alterations in an individual’s body representation 81 
45,46,49,50. Thus, direct investigation of visual capture of embodiment from congruent visuoproprioceptive 82 
cues alone (i.e. in the absence of tactile stimulation) has been less studied with regard to eating disorder 83 
psychopathology. 84 
 85 
Importantly, greater illusory embodiment in acute eating disorder patients has been shown to 86 
persist to some degree amongst recovered patients, suggesting that such heightened sensitivity to visual 87 
information pertaining to the body may be a trait phenomenon 49. Therefore, such visual dominance 88 
over other sensory information may be independent from a status of malnutrition, and may occur prior 89 
to illness onset which could influence an individual’s body perception and body satisfaction 51–53. Thus, 90 
it may be that healthy individuals who display an increased visual capture of embodiment towards a 91 
fake body (part) show an increased visual dominance over other sensory information, which may link 92 
with a greater risk of developing distortions in body image. Consequently, the present study aimed to 93 
investigate whether subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology and body concerns may modulate 94 
the subjective embodiment shown towards a fake body as a result of mere visual capture. 95 
 96 
In addition to research investigating visuoproprioceptive integration, the importance of 97 
interoception in multisensory integration and body ownership has only recently been investigated 9,54,55. 98 
Interoception refers to information about the internal states of the body, processing sensations from 99 
within the body (e.g. hunger, thirst), but also outside the body (e.g. pleasure, pain), which is conveyed 100 
by a particular afferent pathway 8. Affective touch - i.e. slow, caress-like touch – is associated with 101 
increased pleasantness and has been found to activate specific C-Tactile (CT) afferents found only in 102 
the hairy skin, responding maximally to stroking velocities between 1 and 10 cm/sec 56. Importantly, 103 
affective tactile stimulation appears to be dissociable from exteroceptive, discriminatory stimulation 104 
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such as non-affective touch 57. Such CT afferents are hypothesised to take a distinct pathway to the 105 
posterior insular cortex 58,59, an area associated with the early convergence of interoceptive information 106 
with exteroceptive bodily signals 8,60,61.  107 
 108 
Increasing evidence has shown that the velocity of perceived touch during visuotactile 109 
integration plays an influential role within the sense of body ownership. Specifically, touch delivered 110 
at CT-optimal velocities has been shown to increase embodiment during the RHI paradigm compared 111 
with fast, non-affective touch 35,62–64, however, evidence of this effect in the full body illusion remains 112 
equivocal 65. Moreover, recent research has shown that individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) display 113 
a reduced subjective pleasantness to touch, relative to healthy controls 60; however, it is yet to be 114 
investigated how eating disorder psychopathology may modulate the extent to which individuals show 115 
alterations in their experience of touch, or vice versa. Therefore, within our second experiment, 116 
individual differences in the perception of touch will be investigated in relation to subthreshold eating 117 
disorder psychopathology.  118 
 119 
In addition to enhancement of embodiment via interoceptive signals, evidence from patient 120 
populations with chronic pain has shown how feelings of body ownership can be disturbed 66,67 (but see 121 
68 for review). Changes in interoceptive information (e.g. increased limb temperature) has been shown 122 
to disrupt the feelings of embodiment by decreasing the strength of the effect within multisensory 123 
illusions 69. Therefore, in addition to mere visual capture towards subjective embodiment (visual 124 
capture condition), the present study aimed to investigate the effects of tactile stimulation administered 125 
to participants’ own, unseen arm during visual observation of the mannequin body, as a control 126 
condition designed to ‘disrupt’ visual capture by introducing sensory input that is incongruent with 127 
participants’ visual information (tactile disruption condition). Furthermore, we aimed to investigate 128 
whether CT-optimal, affective touch (i.e. touch administered in CT-optimal velocities) would provide 129 
additional interoceptive information on one’s own body which would be expected to disrupt visual 130 
capture of embodiment to a greater extent compared with discriminatory, non-affective touch. Previous 131 
research has suggested that the perception of interoceptive signals depends on an individual’s ability to 132 
regulate the balance between interoceptive and exteroceptive information in ambiguous contexts 9,35,70. 133 
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Thus, differences in an individual’s sensitivity and balance between these two streams of information 134 
may determine the degree of embodiment change shown during tactile disruption conditions. 135 
 136 
In brief, we investigated whether mere visual observation of a mannequin body would lead to 137 
subjective embodiment when visuoproprioceptive cues are congruent with one’s own body. Based on 138 
previous research 16,25, we predicted that a compatible first-person perspective of a mannequin body 139 
would be sufficient to elicit subjective embodiment amongst participants, independent of concomitant 140 
tactile stimulation. In addition, we investigated the extent to which subjective embodiment towards the 141 
mannequin body was reduced when visual capture of proprioception was disrupted by tactile 142 
stimulation to participant’s own, unseen arm. We manipulated the velocity of tactile stimulation that 143 
participants received, to investigate whether slow, affective touch had a differential effect on the 144 
disruption of embodiment compared with fast, non-affective touch. Specifically, we predicted that the 145 
increased interoceptive information associated with affective touch would disrupt the downregulation 146 
of proprioceptive signals by visual capture to a greater extent compared to non-affective touch. Finally, 147 
we investigated whether subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology modulated any individual 148 
differences in subjective embodiment from visual capture. We hypothesized that higher eating disorder 149 
vulnerability would be associated with an increased weighting of visual information, and thus increased 150 
visual capture of embodiment. The above measures were replicated across two experiments, with the 151 
addition of a separate touch task in Experiment 2, designed to investigate the role of subjective 152 
pleasantness of touch in relation to subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology. Extending upon 153 
findings from clinical populations 60, we expected to observe a negative relationship between the above 154 
two measures, such that individuals with higher eating disorder psychopathology were hypothesised to 155 
display a reduced pleasantness to both affective touch and non-affective touch.  156 
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2.! Methods  157 
2.1 Experiment 1 158 
2.1.1 Participants 159 
Forty-one healthy female participants (Mean age = 20.10, SD ± 2.48, range = 18-31) were 160 
recruited via the University of York research participation scheme and received course credit for a 161 
single 60-minute testing session. Participants had a mean BMI of 21.48 (SD ± 2.40, range = 18.30-162 
28.60), no current or previous neurological or psychological disorders (self-report), and normal or 163 
corrected-to-normal vision. Exclusion criteria included any specific skin conditions (e.g. eczema, 164 
psoriasis) or any scarring or tattoos on the left arm. All participants gave informed consent to take part 165 
in the study. The study received ethical approval from the University of York Departmental Ethics 166 
Committee and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. One participant was 167 
later excluded because she self-reported a previous psychological condition, therefore, the final sample 168 
consisted of forty participants (Mean age = 20.15, SD ± 2.49, range = 18-31). Post-hoc power analyses 169 
using G*Power 3.1.9.2 71 indicated that this number of participants resulted in 99% and 97% power to 170 
obtain significant effects following visual capture and tactile disruption conditions, respectively (see 171 
Section 2.3). 172 
  173 
2.1.2 Design 174 
The experiment employed a within-subjects design to investigate the effects of visual and tactile 175 
signals towards the subjective embodiment of a mannequin body. First, during visual capture trials 176 
participants visually observed the mannequin body for 30 seconds, from a first-person perspective, 177 
independent of any tactile stimulation. Second, participants also undertook trials identical to the visual 178 
capture condition, but with the addition of tactile stimulation applied (only) to participant’s own, unseen 179 
arm, designed to disrupt such visual capture (tactile disruption condition) for 60 seconds. Stimulation 180 
was administered at two different velocities to give rise to affective (3cm/s) and non-affective (18 cm/s) 181 
tactile disruption. The dependent variable was the subjective embodiment experienced by participants, 182 
rated after each trial via an embodiment questionnaire (see Measures section and Table 1 for details). 183 
The same embodiment questionnaire was completed for both visual capture and tactile disruption 184 
conditions. Participants completed two visual capture trials, each followed by an affective or non-185 
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affective tactile disruption trial in counterbalanced order between participants, resulting in a total of 4 186 
trials per participant (see Figure 1).  187 
 188 
INSERT FIGURE 1  189 
 190 
2.1.3 Measures 191 
2.1.3.1 Embodiment Questionnaire 192 
Following each trial, participants rated their subjective embodiment via an embodiment 193 
questionnaire (see Table 1) along a 7-point Likert scale (-3 strongly disagree to +3 strongly agree). This 194 
questionnaire (adapted from Longo et al., 2008) was composed of two subcomponents: ownership (i.e. 195 
the feeling that the mannequin body belongs to them) and location (i.e. the feeling that the mannequin 196 
body was in the position of their own body). An overall embodiment score was calculated by averaging 197 
the above two subcomponent scores. The final two statements were control statements, in which an 198 
overall control score was similarly calculated by averaging across the two control items. These scores 199 
served to control for task compliance, suggestibility, and confabulation within the visual capture 200 
condition to compare with embodiment scores. Such control statements are similar, body-related items 201 
to those of the embodiment statements, but importantly do not capture the phenomenological experience 202 
of embodiment. Consequently, comparisons between embodiment and control scores acted to indicate 203 
whether a significant sense of embodiment occurred following the visual capture condition. 204 
 205 
2.1.3.2 Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q) 6.0 206 
The EDE-Q is a 28-item questionnaire used as a self-report measure of eating disorder 207 
psychopathology 72 amongst community populations. The questionnaire assesses frequency of 208 
disordered eating behaviours (6 items), as well as eating behaviours and attitudes (22 items) within the 209 
past 28 days, along four subscales: Dietary Restraint, Eating Concern, Weight Concern and Shape 210 
Concern, which are also averaged for a Global EDE-Q Score. Items are rated along a 7-point (0-6) 211 
Likert scale, with higher scores signifying greater eating disorder psychopathology. This measure has 212 
good internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .78 to .93 in a non-clinical sample 73. 213 
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The overall global EDE-Q measure in the present study had a Cronbach’s alpha of .95 in both 214 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 215 
 216 
 217 
2.1.4 Materials 218 
A life-size female mannequin was used within the experimental set-up. The mannequin was 219 
dressed in a white t-shirt, blue jeans and black socks, with the head removed at the neckline to enable 220 
correct positioning of the video cameras. The body had a waist circumference of 62cm and was in a 221 
standing position with arms placed by their side (see Figure 2). During all trials, participants wore a set 222 
of head-mounted displays (HMDs) (Oculus Rift DK2, Oculus VR, Irvine, CA, USA), with a resolution 223 
of 1200 x 1080 pixels per eye, a refresh rate of 75Hz, and a corresponding nominal visual field of 100°. 224 
The HMDs were connected to a stereoscopic camera (Ovrvision Pro USB 3.0 VR stereo camera, Japan), 225 
presenting a real time, video image to participants. The cameras were mounted and positioned 226 
downwards, at the eye line of the mannequin, capturing a first-person perspective of the body, 227 
compatible with looking down towards one’s own body. During tactile disruption trials, tactile 228 
stimulation was applied using a cosmetic make-up brush (Natural hair Blush Brush, N◦7, The Boots 229 
Company). All experimental trials and responses were made using PsychoPy 2 74 on an Apple iMac 230 
desktop computer (1.6GHz dual-core Intel Core i5 processor). 231 
 232 
INSERT FIGURE 2  233 
 234 
2.1.5! Experimental Procedure  235 
Prior to the experiment, two adjacent 9 cm x 4cm stroking areas were marked on the hairy skin of 236 
each participants’ left forearm, using a washable marker pen 62,75. This provided a specific area for 237 
which to administer tactile stimulation for participants. Stimulation alternated between these two 238 
stroking areas within each tactile disruption trial, to minimise habituation, and provide the experimenter 239 
with an assigned area to control the pressure of each stroke. For all experimental trials, participants 240 
stood to the right of the mannequin body, separated by an office screen divider (see Figure 2a), whilst 241 
wearing the HMDs. Participants were instructed to remain still, place their arms by their side, and look 242 
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down as though towards their own body. A live video image (delay ~ 60ms) of the mannequin body, 243 
viewed from a first-person perspective, appeared in place of their own body through the HMDs (see 244 
Figure 2b).  245 
 246 
For visual capture trials, participants visually observed the mannequin body for a 30-second period, 247 
without any tactile stimulation. Immediately after the trial, participants removed the HMDs and rated 248 
their subjective embodiment towards the mannequin via the embodiment questionnaire (see Table 1) 249 
on a separate computer. Removing the HMDs following each trial also served as a rest period for 250 
participants to move freely and dissociate their subjective experience between trials. For tactile 251 
disruption trials, participants identically visually observed the mannequin body, with the experimenter 252 
stroking participants’ own, unseen arm for a 60-second period. Stroking velocity was manipulated by 253 
administering slow, affective touch (3cm/s), and fast, non-affective touch (18cm/s). The experimenter 254 
was trained to administer each stroke at the precise speed within the assigned stroking area (9cm x 255 
4cm), by counting the number of strokes within a window of 3 seconds per individual stimulation (i.e. 256 
one 3s-long stroke for 3 cm/s velocity, and six 0.5s-long strokes for 18 cm/s velocity). Identically, 257 
immediately after tactile disruption trials, participants removed the HMDs and rated their subjective 258 
embodiment towards the mannequin via the embodiment questionnaire. Individual questionnaire items 259 
were presented in a randomized order across all trials.   260 
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2.2 Experiment 2 261 
2.2.1 Participants 262 
Forty-three healthy female participants (Mean age = 18.98, SD ± .74, range = 18 - 20) were 263 
recruited via the University of York research participation scheme and received course credit for a 264 
single 60-minute testing session. Participants had a mean BMI of 21.89 (SD ± 2.67, range = 16.66-265 
28.32), no current or previous neurological or psychological disorders (self-report), and normal or 266 
corrected-to-normal vision. Exclusion criteria included any specific skin conditions (e.g. eczema, 267 
psoriasis) or any scarring or tattoos on the left arm. All participants gave informed consent to take part 268 
in the study. The study received ethical approval from the University of York Departmental Ethics 269 
Committee and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Three participants were 270 
later excluded; one following a self-reported previous psychological condition; one excluded with 271 
scarring on their arms, and one excluded following poor comprehension with the experimental 272 
procedure. Therefore, the final sample consisted of forty participants (Mean age = 18.98, SD ± .77, 273 
range = 18 - 20). Post-hoc power analyses using G*Power 3.1.9.2 71 indicated that this number of 274 
participants resulted in 99% power to obtain significant effects following both visual capture and tactile 275 
disruption conditions(see Section 2.3). 276 
 277 
2.2.2 Design, Materials, Measures, Procedure 278 
Design, Materials, Measures and Procedures were identical to Experiment 1, with the addition 279 
of a separate Touch Task completed prior to the Full Body Illusion, which explored subjective 280 
pleasantness ratings of affective vs. non-affective touch based solely on tactile input, in relation to 281 
subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology amongst healthy females. 282 
 283 
Touch Task 284 
Participants were asked to place their left arm on the table with their palm facing down and 285 
wore a blindfold over their eyes to prevent any visual feedback to tactile stimulation. Tactile stimulation 286 
was administered using an identical cosmetic make-up brush (see Materials above) for 3 seconds per 287 
trial, at the same velocities as those in the tactile disruption conditions (affective touch - 3 cm/sec and 288 
non-affective touch - 18 cm/sec). There was a total of six trials per velocity condition, for a total of 18 289 
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trials, with all trials presented in a randomized order for each participant. Following each trial, 290 
participants verbally reported the pleasant of the touch, using the pleasantness rating VAS scale, 291 
anchored from 0 (Not at all pleasant) to 100 (Extremely pleasant) 60. An average score across the six 292 
trials was calculated to obtain a single score, per participant, for each of the two tactile conditions.  293 
 294 
2.3 Data Analysis 295 
All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS version 23.0 (IBM, Chicago, IL, USA). 296 
Data from the embodiment questionnaire were ordinal and found to be non-normal via a Shapiro-Wilk 297 
test (p < .05), thus, appropriate non-parametric tests were used for analysis. Data for pleasantness ratings 298 
in the Touch Task were normally distributed (p > .05), therefore parametric tests were used to analyse 299 
this data. Effect sizes for parametric tests are indicated by Cohen’s d, and non-parametric Wilcoxon 300 
signed-rank tests are indicated by r values (r) which are equivalent to Cohen’s d 76. 301 
 302 
First, to indicate whether a significant sense of subjective embodiment occurred following mere 303 
visual observation of a mannequin body (i.e. visual capture effect), we used a Wilcoxon signed-rank 304 
test to compare embodiment scores with control scores within the embodiment questionnaire (see Table 305 
1 for embodiment questionnaire items). Such comparisons were made to ensure that positive subjective 306 
embodiment was specific to the visual capture effect and not due to task compliance or suggestibility, 307 
with control items not expected to score highly, irrespective of illusory experience. Second, to 308 
investigate whether subjective embodiment was significantly reduced when visual capture was 309 
disrupted by tactile stimulation to participant’s own, unseen arm (tactile disruption), a further Wilcoxon 310 
signed-rank test was conducted to compare subjective embodiment scores between visual capture and 311 
tactile disruption conditions. Moreover, we assessed whether slow, affective touch on participants own 312 
arm led to greater disruption in subjective embodiment within participants compared with fast, non-313 
affective touch, using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare embodiment scores between the two 314 
stroking velocities (affective vs. non-affective tactile disruption). The above analyses were also 315 
conducted for individual Ownership and Location subcomponents within the embodiment questionnaire 316 
(see Supplementary Materials, Sections 1 and 2). In addition, in Experiment 2 we examined the effect 317 
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of stroking velocity on pleasantness ratings using a paired-samples t-test, to first establish whether slow, 318 
affective touch was indeed perceived as significantly more pleasant that fast, non-affective touch 319 
(manipulation check). The perception of touch was then investigated in relation to subthreshold eating 320 
disorder psychopathology (as measured by the EDE-Q 6.0), using a non-parametric Spearman’s 321 
correlation. 322 
 323 
To establish individual differences in reported visual capture of embodiment, we calculated 324 
percentage frequencies across the combined samples of Experiment 1 and 2, of those who reported 325 
visual capture of embodiment (average scores of ≥ +1 in response to the embodiment questionnaire 3,77), 326 
those who neither affirmed or denied embodiment (average scores of < +1 and > -1 in response to the 327 
embodiment questionnaire) and those who denied visual capture (average scores of < -1 in the 328 
embodiment questionnaire). Finally, we wished to explore whether such individual differences in 329 
subjective embodiment from visual capture related to subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology 330 
(EDE-Q 6.0). Therefore, we conducted a non-parametric Spearman’s correlational analysis between the 331 
psychometric EDE-Q measure and subjective embodiment scores from visual capture.  332 
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3.! Results  333 
3.1 Experiment 1 334 
3.1.1 Embodiment Questionnaire 335 
Preliminary analysis showed that there was no effect of trial order across visual capture trials, 336 
with a Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealing no significant difference in embodiment scores between 337 
visual capture trial 1 vs. trial 2 (Z = - .084, p = .933). Therefore, embodiment questionnaire scores were 338 
collapsed across the two visual capture trials to provide an overall visual capture embodiment score, 339 
per participant. 340 
 341 
3.1.1.1 Main effect: Visual Capture 342 
To examine the effects of mere visual capture towards subjective embodiment of the mannequin 343 
body, we compared embodiment scores with control scores in the embodiment questionnaire. A 344 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed a main effect of visual capture, with significantly higher 345 
embodiment scores compared with control scores (Z = -4.04, p < .001, r = .64) (see Figure 3).  346 
 347 
3.1.1.2 Main effect: Tactile Disruption 348 
In order to determine whether tactile disruption to participants’ own unseen arm would disrupt 349 
subjective embodiment, we compared embodiment scores between tactile disruption and visual capture 350 
conditions. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed a main effect of condition, in which participants 351 
showed significantly lower subjective embodiment following tactile disruption trials (median = -.38) 352 
compared with visual capture trials (median = .82) (Z = -3.74, p < .001, r = .59). 353 
 354 
3.1.1.3 Main effect: Tactile Velocity 355 
Next, we examined whether tactile velocity had an effect in disrupting the subjective 356 
embodiment towards the mannequin body within tactile disruption trials. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 357 
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revealed that there was no significant difference in embodiment scores between affective and non-358 
affective tactile disruption trials (Z = -.104, p = .918, r = .02), which suggests that interoceptive affective 359 
touch did not disrupt visual capture of embodiment to a greater degree than exteroceptive, non-affective 360 
touch. 361 
 362 
3.2 Experiment 2 363 
3.2.1 Touch Task (Manipulation Check)  364 
A further one participant was later excluded within the Touch Task analysis as an extreme 365 
outlier, scoring more than 2 SD below the group mean in pleasantness ratings of affective touch (3cm/s 366 
velocity) 34. Therefore, the final sample for this analysis consisted of 39 participants. As expected, a 367 
paired samples t-test revealed an effect of stroking velocity within the touch task, with significantly 368 
higher subjective pleasantness ratings following affective touch (3cm/s) (mean = 74.27) compared with 369 
non-affective touch (18cm/s) (mean = 52.94) (t (38) = 7.93, p < .001, d = 1.27). Moreover, correlational 370 
analyses were conducted to investigate the relationship between pleasantness ratings and subthreshold 371 
eating disorder psychopathology (measured by the Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire; EDE-372 
Q 6.0). First, a Spearman’s rank correlation revealed an approaching significant correlation between 373 
pleasantness ratings (average affective/non-affective touch) and global EDE-Q score (r = -.316, p = 374 
.05). Next, difference scores were calculated between affective and non-affective touch pleasantness 375 
ratings to determine whether those with higher subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology were less 376 
sensitive to differences in the affectivity of touch. However, a Spearman’s rank correlation revealed no 377 
significant correlation between touch difference score and global EDE-Q (r = .014, p = .935). Thus, the 378 
results suggest a trend in which those scoring higher in subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology 379 
may show a reduced pleasantness to all tactile stimulation, however this may not be further modulated 380 
by the affectivity of the touch that they receive. 381 
 382 
 383 
 384 
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3.2.2 Embodiment Questionnaire 385 
Preliminary analysis showed that there was no effect of trial order across visual capture trials, 386 
with a Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealing no significant difference in embodiment scores between 387 
visual capture trial 1 vs. trial 2 (Z = - .958, p = .338). Therefore, embodiment questionnaire scores were 388 
collapsed across the two visual capture trials to provide an overall visual capture embodiment score, 389 
per participant. 390 
 391 
3.2.2.1 Main effect: Visual Capture 392 
To examine the effects of mere visual capture towards subjective embodiment of the mannequin 393 
body, we compared embodiment scores with control scores in the embodiment questionnaire. A 394 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed a main effect of visual capture, with significantly higher 395 
embodiment scores compared with control scores (Z = -4.30, p < .001, r = .68) (see Figure 3).  396 
 397 
3.2.2.2 Main effect: Tactile Disruption 398 
In order to determine whether tactile disruption to participants’ own unseen arm would disrupt 399 
subjective embodiment, we compared embodiment scores between tactile disruption and visual capture 400 
conditions. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed a main effect of condition, in which participants 401 
showed significantly lower subjective embodiment following tactile disruption trials (median = -.23) 402 
compared with visual capture trials (median = .59) (Z = -4.08, p < .001, r = .65). 403 
 404 
3.2.2.3 Main effect: Tactile Velocity 405 
Next, we examined whether tactile velocity had an effect in disrupting the subjective 406 
embodiment towards the mannequin body within tactile disruption trials. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test 407 
revealed that there was no significant difference in embodiment scores between affective and non-408 
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affective tactile disruption trials (Z = - .354, p = .723, r = .06), which suggests that interoceptive 409 
affective touch did not disrupt embodiment to a greater degree than exteroceptive, non-affective touch. 410 
 411 
INSERT FIGURE 3 412 
 413 
3.3 Combined Samples 414 
3.3.1 Visual Capture of Embodiment – Individual Differences 415 
Across the combined, total sample (N=80), 32 participants (40%) experienced a degree of 416 
embodiment over the mannequin from mere visual capture, with average scores of ≥ +1 in response to 417 
the embodiment questionnaire (hereafter referred to as ‘visual capture’ (VC) group). To confirm this 418 
percentage was not a consequence of participant compliance, a Wilcoxon signed rank test was 419 
conducted which revealed a significant difference between embodiment and control scores (Z = -4.71, 420 
p < .001, r = .74), with only 4 participants (12.5%) of the VC group scoring ≥ +1 in response to control 421 
items. 36 participants (45%) seemed to neither affirm or deny embodiment over the mannequin, with 422 
average scores of < +1 and > -1 in response to the embodiment questionnaire (hereafter referred to as 423 
‘borderline’ group). 12 participants (15%) of the total sample denied any subjective embodiment from 424 
visual capture, with average scores of < -1 in the embodiment questionnaire (hereafter referred to as 425 
‘no visual capture’ (no-VC) group). 426 
 427 
3.3.3 Subthreshold Eating Disorder Psychopathology 428 
Finally, correlational analyses were conducted to investigate the relationship between visual capture 429 
effects and subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology (measured by the EDE-Q 6.0). EDE-Q 430 
subscale and global scores across both experiments are presented in Table 2. A Spearman’s rank 431 
correlation revealed no significant correlation between visual capture embodiment scores and global 432 
EDE-Q scores (r = .030, p = .79), or any EDE-Q subscale scores (all ps > .05). Similarly, no significant 433 
correlations were observed when analysing subcomponent (Ownership and Location) scores within the 434 
embodiment questionnaire with EDE-Q scores (see Supplementary Materials, Section 3). This suggests 435 
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that subthreshold attitudes and behaviours regarding to eating and body image did not relate to the 436 
degree of subjective embodiment of a mannequin body due to mere visual capture. 437 
 438 
INSERT TABLE 1  439 
 440 
Data Availability  441 
The datasets analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on 442 
reasonable request.  443 
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4.! Discussion 444 
 445 
The present study investigated the extent to which mere visual observation of a mannequin body, 446 
viewed from a first-person perspective, influenced subjective embodiment independently from 447 
concomitant visuotactile integration. Across two experiments, our results showed that congruent 448 
visuoproprioceptive cues between one’s own physical body and a mannequin body was sufficient to 449 
induce subjective embodiment in 40% of our total sample. Furthermore, as expected, embodiment was 450 
significantly reduced when ‘visual capture’ of embodiment was disrupted by tactile stimulation to 451 
participant’s own, unseen arm, confirming that the visual capture effect on embodiment was not due to 452 
confabulatory or social desirability responses. Contrary to our secondary hypothesis regarding 453 
interoception, this tactile disruption effect was not modulated by stroking velocity, with comparable 454 
changes in embodiment following slow, affective (CT-optimal) and fast, non-affective touch. Finally, 455 
subthreshold eating disorder psychopathology was not found to modulate the effects of embodiment in 456 
visual capture or tactile disruption conditions. 457 
 458 
Our findings support previous research which argues that synchronous visuotactile stimulation is 459 
not a necessary condition amongst all individuals in triggering subjective embodiment within bodily 460 
illusions. Research has shown that visual capture of proprioception can be sufficient to elicit 461 
embodiment towards a fake hand 25,36 and whole body 16 in some individuals. Indeed, whilst Maselli 462 
and Slater (2013) have shown this effect using a full body within an immersive, virtual environment, 463 
the present study is the first to explore this effect towards a full body in the ‘physical world’. Our results 464 
suggest that multisensory illusion paradigms would benefit from a baseline measure based on the mere 465 
visual observation of the fake body (part) (i.e. visual capture effect), which is unbiased by concomitant 466 
visuotactile stimulation 35,62. Indeed, this is in support of research which argues that asynchronous 467 
stimulation in multisensory illusion paradigms is not strictly a neutral, control condition within 468 
multisensory body illusions 29,33, with visuotactile asynchrony instead providing somatosensory conflict 469 
29,78. 470 
 471 
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The present data showed that a substantial percentage of participants displayed a degree of 472 
subjective embodiment towards the mannequin body following mere visual observation. Indeed, it was 473 
confirmed that such individuals who did display visual capture of embodiment were not simply 474 
complying with all items in the embodiment questionnaire, shown by significantly higher responses in 475 
embodiment scores compared with control scores (see Results section). However, congruent 476 
visuoproprioceptive signals did not induce subjective embodiment amongst all individuals to the same 477 
degree. We speculate that such individual differences may be due to a number of processes; for example, 478 
some individuals may have weaker proprioceptive signals which would give rise to greater sensory 479 
weighting towards the salient visual cues of the mannequin body within the illusion. Indeed, our own 480 
hypothesis that individual differences in visual capture may relate to subthreshold eating disorder 481 
psychopathology was not confirmed (see below for further discussion). Thus, further research is 482 
required to establish how individual differences in the weighting of distinct sensory cues contribute to 483 
modulating body ownership in mere visual capture conditions, and how increased visual weighting may 484 
thus influence the perception of visuotactile synchrony within typical multisensory illusion paradigms.  485 
 486 
Furthermore, our results showed that tactile stimulation to participants own, unseen arm 487 
significantly disrupted subjective embodiment towards the mannequin body, by delivering 488 
somatosensory information that was incongruent with participants visuoproprioceptive cues. This result 489 
further highlights that the embodiment shown from visual capture conditions were not due to participant 490 
compliance, as disruption to such visual capture resulted in significantly lower embodiment scores. 491 
From a computational approach to multisensory integration 25,30,79, such incongruent tactile information 492 
is likely to have disrupted the sensory weighting that is occurring between visual and proprioceptive 493 
body signals 32. Indeed, predictive coding accounts of multisensory illusions argue that illusory 494 
embodiment typically occurs by the brain downregulating the precision of conflicting, bottom-up 495 
somatosensory signals, which allows top-down predictions to resolve any sensory ambiguity about the 496 
body (i.e. the body (part) I see is mine) 30. Therefore, in the present study, additional tactile input to 497 
participants’ own, unseen arm added further somatosensory information which could not be 498 
downregulated or “explained away” by top-down predictions, given its incongruency with the visually 499 
perceived mannequin body 80, thus leading to reduced subjective embodiment.  500 
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 501 
Moreover, it was expected that the interoceptive properties associated with slow, affective touch 35 502 
would disrupt subjective embodiment to a greater degree than fast, non-affective touch. This is 503 
following evidence that affective touch led to enhanced embodiment during RHI paradigms 62–64, which 504 
is argued to be due to the additional interoceptive information conveyed by this CT-optimal touch 81. 505 
Further, research has shown that manipulation of interoceptive information (e.g. changes in body 506 
temperature) can disrupt feelings of body ownership 69. However, contrary to our predictions and 507 
previous findings, our results showed that the interoceptive, affective tactile stimuli did not appear to 508 
disrupt visual capture of embodiment to a greater extent than non-affective tactile stimuli. Such findings 509 
may be because the salience of incongruent visuotactile information was sufficient in disrupting 510 
embodiment towards the mannequin, with the subtlety of increased interoceptive information from the 511 
arm following affective touch providing no additional value to multisensory integration in this context. 512 
Furthermore, the previously observed effects of affective touch in enhancing body ownership during 513 
the RHI (which involves concomitant felt and seen touch on the rubber hand) may also be explained by 514 
the vicarious affectivity of the seen touch in addition to the interoceptive nature of the felt touch 515 
(Filippetti et al., submitted). Indeed, CT-optimal velocities have been shown to have distinct vicarious 516 
touch effects in behavioural 82 and neuroimaging 61 studies. However, visual cues of affective touch 517 
were not present in the current study, therefore the felt affectivity of the touch may have been attenuated 518 
by participants receiving only tactile stimulation that was not visually observed. 519 
 520 
The present results must be considered in relation to the top-down, cognitive constraints within 521 
which illusory ownership is argued to occur. Research has shown that the embodied fake body (part) 522 
must be in an anatomically plausible position 3,15,22,23, must represent a corporeal object 13,19,20, and must 523 
be viewed from a first-person visual perspective 16–18. Indeed, it has been shown that when these 524 
constraints are violated, illusory effects diminish or disappear 24,83,84, suggesting that the perceived fake 525 
body (part) is required to fit with a reference model of the body based on top-down information 20. The 526 
above conditions were closely adhered to in the present study, which was particularly salient using the 527 
HMDs, allowing a high degree of spatial overlap by replacing the first-person perspective of one’s own 528 
body with the identical perspective of a mannequin body. This provided a greater congruence of 529 
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visuoproprioceptive cues which cannot be as closely matched within the RHI set-up without the use of 530 
computer-generated technology. However, further research should investigate the specific boundaries 531 
within which mere visual capture is sufficient in inducing embodiment towards a whole body, in the 532 
absence of visuotactile stimulation 16,85, by systematically manipulating the above conditions within 533 
which the illusion can typically occur. 534 
 535 
Finally, following evidence that acute eating disorder patients display a dominance in weighting to 536 
visual information related to the body 45,46, which is shown to persist after recovery 49, we explored 537 
whether this trait phenomenon would exist amongst healthy individuals, in relation to subthreshold 538 
eating disorder symptomology. However, no significant correlations were observed between EDE-Q 539 
scores and subjective embodiment following visual capture. This finding is in line with previous 540 
research in which those higher in subthreshold eating disorder symptoms did not experience a stronger 541 
subjective embodiment within the full body illusion 53, despite relationships observed between EDE-Q 542 
scores and subsequent behavioural measures (e.g. body satisfaction) following the illusion (see also 50 543 
for similar effects in AN patients). This suggests that previous findings which highlight differences in 544 
subjective embodiment in relation to eating disorder psychopathology may be body part specific 45,46,86. 545 
Nevertheless, studying eating disorder characteristics within healthy individuals remains clinically 546 
important to identify factors associated with the development of eating disorders without the confounds 547 
of physical consequences of the disorder 87,88. 548 
 549 
Taken together, the present findings are in accordance with previous research which highlights the 550 
dynamic mechanisms that lead to illusory body ownership 16. First, there exists a two-way interaction 551 
between visual information of the fake body (part) and proprioceptive information of one’s own body 552 
(part), which is combined to inform an estimate of an individual’s current spatial position. When the 553 
fake body (part) is in an anatomically plausible position with one’s own body, sensory information 554 
between competing visual and proprioceptive cues is weighted in favour of the salient visual 555 
information 79,89, which for many is sufficient to induce feelings of embodiment to occur prior to 556 
visuotactile integration 16,25. Subsequently, the addition of synchronous visuotactile information creates 557 
a three-way weighted interaction between vision, touch and proprioception, with the visually perceived 558 
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touch processed in a common reference frame based on the visuoproprioceptive cues. The subsequent 559 
‘visual capture’ of synchronous visuotactile stimulation acts to further weaken one’s own 560 
proprioceptive signals, which can lead to increased illusory embodiment 24,84. Thus, future studies which 561 
compare the two-way vs. three-way interaction between sensory inputs would be informative in 562 
quantifying the additive effect that visuotactile stimulation plays within such paradigms. This could 563 
also be used to further investigate individual differences in the susceptibility to integrate 564 
visuoproprioceptive information to a greater degree than the additional integration of tactile stimuli 565 
during the illusion. 566 
 567 
In conclusion, the present study suggests that mere visual observation of a mannequin body, viewed 568 
from a first-person perspective, can elicit subjective embodiment amongst individuals. Congruent 569 
visuoproprioceptive cues between one’s own physical body (part) and a fake body (part) was shown to 570 
be sufficient to induce subjective embodiment in 40% of our total sample in the absence of concomitant 571 
visuotactile stimulation, which is typically used to induce illusory embodiment within multisensory 572 
illusion paradigms. In addition, tactile stimulation delivered to participants own, unseen arm acted to 573 
disrupt reported subjective embodiment, however, this was not influenced to a greater degree by slow, 574 
affective touch compared with fast, non-affective touch. This suggests that interoceptive information 575 
about one’s body does not have the potency of discriminatory tactile signals, when the integration of 576 
vision and proprioception need to be moderated by touch. Future studies should explore this possibility 577 
using other interoceptive modalities such as cardiac awareness, and further investigate how the 578 
perception and integration of sensory signals are implicated within a distorted sense of self amongst 579 
clinical eating disorder populations.  580 
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Figure 1. Timeline of experimental procedure. Participants completed two visual capture (30 secs) conditions and two tactile disruption (60 secs) conditions 
(1x affective touch; 1x non-affective touch). Tactile disruption order was counterbalanced across participants. Participants removed the HMDs following each 
trial and completed the Embodiment Questionnaire on a separate computer.  
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Figure 2. Experimental set-up. a) In visual capture trials, participants stood in an identical stance to the mannequin body, separated by a screen divider.  
b) Participants viewed a live video image of the mannequin from a first-person perspective, via head mounted displays. 
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Figure 3. Box plot displaying embodiment scores and control scores within the embodiment questionnaire. 
Intersecting line = median; box = upper and lower interquartile range; whiskers = minimum and maximum 
values. ** = p <.001. 
 34 
Table 1. Embodiment Questionnaire presented to participants following each trial.  
           Questionnaire Statement Component 
1. It seemed like I was looking directly at my own body, rather than a mannequin body Ownership 
2. It seemed like the mannequin body belonged to me Ownership 
3. It seemed like the mannequin body was part of my body Ownership 
4. It seemed like the mannequin body was in the location where my body was. Location 
5. It felt like I had two bodies (at the same time) Control 
6. It felt like my body was made out of rubber Control 
NB. The order of questionnaire statements was randomized for each trial and participant. 
  
 35 
Table 2. Participant demographic information (Mean and (SD)) and EDE-Q subscale and global scores 
 Note: BMI: Body Mass Index.  
a Median and interquartile range in parentheses 
b Mann-Whitney U statistic 
 
 
 Total (N=80) 
Experiment 1 
(N=40) 
Experiment 2 
(N=40) 
t p 
Age 19.56 (1.92) 20.15 (2.49) 18.98 (.77) 2.86 .006 
BMI 21.70 (2.56) 21.48 (2.40) 21.93 (2.71) -.772 .442 
Restraint .80 (.20-1.80) a .80 (.20-2.15) a .90 (.25-1.75) a -.101b .919 
Eating Concern .60 (.20-1.40) a .60 (.20-1.40) a .60 (.20-1.55) a -.567b .571 
Shape Concern 2.25 (1.16-3.72) a 2.06 (1.25-3.63) a 2.31 (1.00-3.75) a -.106b .916 
Weight Concern 1.40 (.40-3.00) a 1.40 (.40-2.55) a 1.70 (.50-3.20) a -.960b .337 
EDE-Q Global 1.33 (.60 -2.32) a 1.31 (.60-2.17) a 1.35 (.65-2.52) a -.380b .704 
